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I. INTRODUCTION
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, was predicated, in
part, on an allegation that Kuwait and other Persian Gulf nations were
producing oil in excess of quotas established by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC").2 Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein characterized Kuwait and other OPEC countries as "stabbing
Iraq in the back" by causing oil prices to fall and depriving his country
of much needed revenue.3
On the day of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, President Bush issued
two executive orders which placed an embargo on trade and froze the
United States-based assets of Iraq and Kuwait." In a showing of world
unity, the United Nations Security Council voted 13 to 0, with Cuba
and Yemen abstaining, to follow the United States' initiative by requir-
ing all member states to impose similar sanctions in accordance with a
United Nations resolution. 5
In addition to the imposition of sanctions, the invasion affected
U.S. foreign policy in a less overt manner by motivating the U.S. Gov-
ernment to implement immediate proliferation controls relating to
chemical and biological weapons on Iraq and other countries. This Ar-
January 17, 1991, at A29.
2. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IRAQ-KUWAIT CRISIS: U.S. POLICY AND
OPTIONS, ISSUE BRIEF No. IB90117, at 2, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990) [hereinafter
POLICY AND OPTIONS]. OPEC is comprised of delegations from the following countries:
Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. OPEC was established in 1960 and
serves to safeguard the interests of its members in relation to their petroleum produc-
tion. OPEC "aims to unify and co-ordinate members' petroleum policies." 1 THE EU-
ROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 199 (1990).
3. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IRAQ-KUWAIT CRISIS: A CHRONOLOGY
OF EVENTS, July 17, 1990 - September 17, 1990, REP. No. 90-480F, at 22 101st Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1990) [hereinafter CHRONOLOGY]; POLICY AND OPTIONS, supra note 2.
4. Exec. Order No. 12, 724, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089 (1990); Executive Order No. 12,
725, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,091 (1990); Executive Order No. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803
(1990); Exec. Order No. 12,723, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,805 (1990). Considerable debate
exists as to the effectiveness of economic sanctions. Nevertheless, the United States has
increasingly used economic sanctions as a means of obtaining a desired foreign policy
objective. See B. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE
HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME 1 (1988). The United States used economic sanc-
tions for foreign policy reasons approximately 62 times between World War II and
1984. Id. at 10-11. Although there are difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of
sanctions, one study found that sanctions were effective approximately 37 % of the
time. Id. at 14. The sanctions imposed against Iraq and Kuwait appear to be the most
comprehensive in recent U.S. foreign policy.
5. U.N. SCOR (2933rd mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).
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ticle analyzes the effect of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on U.S. foreign
policy and its implications for world policy. Specifically, it analyzes the
sanctions imposed against Iraq and Kuwait by the United Nations and
the United States, and the United States' response to the invasion with.
the implementation of more stringent proliferation controls.
As President Bush observed in his Oval Office address following
the U.S. attack on Iraq, nations are aligning in a new world order
where multilateral cooperation is integral.6 The Persian Gulf War has
accelerated the post-Cold War alignment of nations which began with
the diminished Soviet threat and the emerging democracies in Eastern
Europe. This is evidenced by the truly world-wide effort to impose com-
prehensive sanctions against Iraq.
Moreover, the invasion has created a sense of urgency with respect
to the need for multilateral proliferation controls.' Iraq's actions have
prompted a world-wide realization of the potential threat posed by a
country with missile technology and nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons. The invasion is likely to lead to multilateral proliferation con-
trols through international organizations including the Missile Technol-
ogy Control Regime, the Australia Group and the London Nuclear
Suppliers Group. Because the efforts of these groups will be aimed at
assimilating all nations in the forbearance or controlled uses of missile
technology and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, it is likely
that Eastern bloc membership will be solicited.
II. EVENTS LEADING TO THE INVASION
Before considering the U.S. foreign policy response to the invasion,
it is important to review the major events leading to the Iraqi conflict
during the two weeks before the August 2, 1990 invasion. In particular,
the events are demonstrative of the regional instability which has
served as a catalyst for proliferation controls. On July 18, 1990, a letter
was sent to the Arab League 8 by Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz
6. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated, "I cannot remember
a time when we had the world so strongly together." 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1214
(Aug. 8, 1990).
7. The Administration has stated that its "efforts to stem the spread of weapons of
mass destruction will contribute to the construction of a new world order." White
House press release (March 8, 1991).
8. The League of Arab States was founded in 1945 and is a voluntary association
whose main purpose is to "coordinate [members'] policies and activities and direct
them towards the common good of all Arab countries." 1 THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR
BOOK 1990, at 174 (1990). The Arab League is comprised of the following countries:
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania,
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accusing Kuwait "of stealing Iraqi oil, building military installations,
and refusing to cancel loans it had made to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq
War."9 The letter stated that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates
were exceeding oil production quotas and that if they did not reduce
their oil production, Iraq would be forced to take further measures.'" In
response to Foreign Minister Aziz's letter, Kuwait sent a letter to the
Arab League, on July 19, 1990, stating that "Iraq frequently had vio-
lated Kuwaiti territory and had refused repeatedly to settle long-stand-
ing border disputes."" On July 21, 1990, the Kuwaiti government also
advised the United Nations Secretary General of these developments.
This prompted a response from the Iraqi Government which accused
"Kuwait of implementing an 'Imperialist' plan.' 2 Before the end of
July, both Iraq and Kuwait had amassed troops and military hardware,
including missiles, on their common border and activated a full mili-
tary alert.' 3
In parallel with the escalating tension between Iraq and Kuwait,
Arab leaders attempted to mediate a peaceful resolution. Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak held discussions with Iraqi Foreign Minister
Aziz and the Amir of Kuwait, Shaykh Jabis al-Ahmad al-Sabah, on
July 22 and 24, 1990, respectively." Both countries deemed the media-
tion efforts to be successful and agreed to discuss all disputes. 5 OPEC
moved toward accommodating Iraq's concerns over oil pricing and pro-
duction. On July 27, 1990, the 87th session of OPEC met and decided
to set the bench mark price for oil at $20 dollars per barrel and to limit
production to 22.491 million barrels per day until the end of the year.' 6
Iraq had requested that the price per barrel of oil be increased to $25
dollars, a $10 dollar increase from the then market price. 7 On July 31,
1990, talks between Iraq and Kuwait were held in Saudi Arabia with
Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic, and Yemen People's Democratic Re-
public. Id.
9. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 3, at 22.
10. Id.
11. id.
12. Id. at 21.
13. Id. at 20-21.
14. Id. at 21; See also ACCESS Guide to the Persian Gulf Crisis, ACCESS: A
Security Information Service, at 7 (1991) [hereinafter ACCESS].
15. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 3, at 21.
16. Id.; ACCESS, supra note 14, at 7.
17. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT: A RE-
VIEW OF EVENTS, REP. No. IB90118, at 2, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess.(1990) [hereinafter
INVASION].
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King Fahd of Saudi Arabia mediating.18 Iraq reportedly "demanded
concessions from Kuwait for seizing Iraqi territory and stealing $2.4
billion worth of oil from disputed oil fields along their common border.
Iraq had also demanded that Kuwait cancel [their] estimated $10 bil-
lion war debt." '19 Parties concluded their talks the following day but
failed to reach an agreement. Future meetings were discussed but not
scheduled."0
On August 2, 1990, Iraq moved over 100,000 troops, 300 tanks,
artillery, armored personnel carriers, and other supporting forces into
Kuwait. Within six hours, Kuwait was occupied by Iraq.2 Kuwait's
20,000 man army was no match for the Iraqi forces.22 After the inva-
sion, Kuwait's ruling Amir fled to Saudi Arabia and a group of
Kuwaiti revolutionaries reportedly formed a new provisional govern-
ment. 3 Iraq claimed that the installed Provisional Free Government of
Kuwait asked for assistance from Iraq and would eventually hold
elections. 4
The immediate multilateral response to the Iraqi invasion was, in
some instances, to impose sanctions, and in others, to condemn Iraq's
actions. On the day of the invasion, the United States, France and Brit-
ain imposed sanctions against Iraq. The Soviet Union, Israel, Japan,
Iran and the European Community, and several countries in Latin
America, Africa and Eastern Europe, condemned the Iraqi use of
force. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 660
calling for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.
2 5
III. SANCTIONS IMPOSED AGAINST IRAQ AND KUWAIT
A. Sanctions Imposed by the United Nations Security Council
From August 2 until the end of November 1990, the United Na-
tions Security Council adopted twelve resolutions concerning the Iraqi
18. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 3, at 20.
19. Id.; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, OIL AND IRAQ'S INVASION OF
KAUWAIT, REP. No. 90-116 at 2, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990).
20. Id.
21. INVASION, supra note 17, at 3; POLICY AND OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 2.
22. INVASION, supra note 17, at 3.
23. Id.; POLICY AND OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 2.
24. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 3, at 19. Less than two weeks earlier in his own
country, Saddam Hussein was declared President for life by the Parliament, which is
dominated by Hussein's Ba'ath Party. Id. at 22. To observers, this was a clear indica-
tion that Hussein had no intention of conducting free elections in his own country as he
had promised. Id.
25. Id. at 19-20. Resolution 660 passed in a 14-0 vote with Yemen abstaining.
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invasion of Kuwait. These resolutions established sanctions against Iraq
and Kuwait and authorized member states to enforce the sanctions.
The United Nations imposed sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait on Au-
gust 6, 1990, by a vote of 13 to 0 with Cuba and Yemen abstaining.28
The Security Council cited Iraq's failure to withdraw its troops imme-
diately and unconditionally from Kuwaiti territory, as called for in Se-
curity Council Resolution 660.27
Subsequent resolutions, particularly Resolutions 66528 and 670,29
26. U.N. SCOR (2933rd mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990), [hereinafter Res-
olution 661]. Resolution 661, required, inter alia, that each member state prevent: (i)
the import into the member state of products originating from Iraq and Kuwait; (ii)
any activities which would promote the export or trans-shipment of any products from
Iraq or Kuwait and any dealings in any products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and
exported therefrom, including the transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes
of such activities or dealings; (iii) the sale or supply of any products to Iraq or Kuwait,
including weapons or any other military equipment, but not including supplies for med-
ical purposes and food provided under humanitarian circumstances; and (iv) the fur-
nishing of funds or other financial and economic resources to the Government of Iraq
or to persons or entities within Iraq or Kuwait, except as payment for supplies for
medical purposes and food provided under humanitarian circumstances. Id. at 2.
Pursuant to Resolution 661, a committee was established to study the implementa-
tion of the sanctions and to gather information from the member states concerning
implementation within their countries. Id. The committee is also to examine requests
for assistance from Iraq and Kuwait and to review whether humanitarian circum-
stances exist which justify the furnishing of food. U.N. SCOR (2939th mtg.), U.N.
Doc. S/RES/666 at 2 (1990); U.N. SCOR (2942d mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/669 at 1
(1990). The Security Council may determine whether humanitarian circumstances ex-
ist and will supervise, together with appropriate humanitarian agencies, the furnishing
of food to ensure that the food reaches the intended beneficiaries. Id.
27. Id.
28. U.N. SCOR (2938th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990). Resolution 665
calls upon member states with maritime forces deployed in the Persian Gulf "to use
such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under
the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping
[from Iraq or Kuwait] in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations:"
Id. at 10-11.
29. U.N. SCOR (2943rd mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/670 (1990). Resolution 670
requires that member states "deny permission to any aircraft to take off from their
territory if the aircraft would carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait" except as
permitted by Resolution 661. Id. at 2. The Resolution further requires that member
states deny permission to any aircraft destined to land in Iraq or Kuwait to overfly the
member state's territory unless the aircraft has been inspected to ensure compliance
with Resolution 661, the flight is certified by the committee established by the Security
Council, or it is a UNIIMOG flight. Id. Member states are permitted to take "such
measures as may be necessary" to enforce the resolution while observing international
law, including the Chicago Convention. Id. at 3. Lastly, Resolution 670 calls upon
member states to detain Iraqi ships which have been used in violation of Resolution
RESPONSES TO IRAQI INVASION
clarified the obligations of member states to implement Resolution 661
and specifically granted member states the authority to enforce sanc-
tions. Confronted with Iraq's "flagrant contempt" of the Security
Council's repeated demands, Resolution 678 was issued on November
29, 1990.30 Resolution 678 authorized member states "to use all neces-
sary means to uphold and implement [Resolution 660] and all subse-
quent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and secur-
ity in the area" unless Iraq, on or before January 15, 1991, withdrew
from Kuwait and otherwise fully implemented the resolutions.'
The United Nations' resolutions did not restrict member states
from assisting the legitimate Government of Kuwait in exile, including
taking appropriate measures to protect Kuwait's assets.1
2
B. Implementation of Sanctions by the United States Government
1. Executive Orders and Statutory Authority
Prior to the requirement by the United Nations Security Council
that member states impose sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait, the
President issued two Executive Orders which placed an embargo on
trade with Iraq"3 and blocked both Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets.3 These
executive orders were promulgated under the authority of the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"). 5 With respect to
661 or to deny such ships entrance to their ports. Id.
30. U.S. SCOR (2963rd mtg.), U.N. Doc S/RES/678 (1990).
31. Id.
32. Resolution 661, supra note 26, at 3.
33. Exec. Order 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (1990).
34. Exec. Order 12,723, 55 Fed Reg. 31,805 (1990).
35. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1701-1706 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). IEEPA is the modern
statutory authority for U.S. economic sanctions. However, the U.S. sanctions were tra-
ditionally imposed under the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act ("TWEA")
to prevent the enemy from securing money in times of war. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-6, 7-39
(1917). Aldridge v. Franco-Wyoming Security Corporation, 31 A.2d 246, 27 Del. Ch.
80 (1943). In 1940, in response to the Nazi invasion of Norway and Denmark, the
President prohibited the transfer of property "in which [either country] or any national
thereof [had] an interest, unless . . . licensed by the Treasury." Exec. Order No.
8,389, 5 Fed. Reg. 1,400 (1940). However, since it was not considered a time of war,
Congress authorized the Treasury to act pursuant to the President's Executive Order.
Joint Resolution, May 7, 1940, 54 Stat. 179 (1940). As amended, TWEA expanded
the President's ability to use these powers "during any other period of national emer-
gency declared by the President." Joint Resolution, May 7, 1940, 54 Stat. 179 (1940).
In 1977, TWEA was amended to its original form serving exclusively as a wartime
statutory authority. Nevertheless, some of the oldest sanctions imposed under TWEA
1991]
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any person or property within the jurisdiction of the United States,
IEEPA gives the President the authority to "investigate, regulate, or
prohibit" transactions and other dealings with a foreign country.3 6
Under IEEPA, the President can exercise the power granted
whenever there is an "unusual and extraordinary threat which has its
source in. whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the




However, the President must declare a national emergency to employ
the powers of IEEPA.38
In issuing Executive Orders 12,722 and 12,723, the President de-
clared a national emergency under the National Emergency Ac," 9
finding that "the policies and actions of the Government of Iraq [con-
stituted] an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security
and foreign policy of the United States."'4
After the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 661,
the President superseded Executive Orders 12722 and 12723 with Ex-
ecutive Orders 12,72441 and 12,725.42 The earlier executive orders were
remain in effect today: the postwar East-West trade restrictions, the financial and trade
restrictions against North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia and the sanctions against Cuba.
M. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE, 185 (1990).
36. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
37. Id.
38. Id. The President is also required to comply with a range of procedural safe-
guards that include consulting Congress in every possible instance and reporting to the
Congress whenever IEEPA authority is exercised. 50 U.S.C. § 1703 (1982 & Supp. V
1987). In the report, Congress must be made aware of the circumstances surrounding
the emergency, the nature of the threat involved, the authority to be exercised, the
reasons for the exercise of those authorities, and the countries involved. Id.
39. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
40. Exec. Order No. 12,723, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,805 (1990); Exec. Order No.
12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (1990).
41. 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089 (1990).
42. 55 Fed. Reg. 33,091 (1990). Executive Orders 12,724 and 12,725 impose par-
allel sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait. Taken together, the Executive Orders impose
the sanctions set forth below:
1. All property and interests in property of the Governments of Iraq or Ku-
wait that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United
States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of
United States persons, including their overseas branches, are blocked.
2. The importation into the United States of any goods or services of Iraqi or
Kuwaiti origin is prohibited.
3. The exportation of any good, technology or service to Iraq or Kuwait, or to
any entity operated from Iraq or Kuwait or owned or controlled by the Gov-
ernment of Iraq or Kuwait is prohibited, except medical supplies and food
provided for humanitarian purposes.
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superceded in order to bring U.S. sanctions in compliance with the
sanctions mandated by the United Nations Security Council. Prior to
Security Council Resolution 661, the U.S. sanctions blocked both Iraqi
and Kuwaiti assets but prohibited trade and restricted travel only with
respect to Iraq. Executive Order 12,725 prohibited trade and restricted
travel with Kuwait as required by Resolution 661."'
The U.S. sanctions issued in response to Resolution 661 were im-
posed under the authority of IEEPA and the United Nations Participa-
tion Act ("UNPA"). 4' The UNPA authorizes the President to impose
sanctions against a third nation in accordance with any mandatory de-
cision by the United Nations Security Council. 45
4. United States persons are prohibited from any dealing related to property
of Iraqi or Kuwaiti origin exported from Iraq or Kuwait after August 6, 1990
or intended for exportation to or from Iraq or Kuwait.
5. United States persons are prohibited from any transaction related to travel
to or within Iraq or Kuwait except as necessary to effect a departure from
Iraq or Kuwait and except U.S. Government, United Nations and journalistic
activities and are prohibited from any transaction related to the provision of
transportation to or from the U.S. by an Iraqi or Kuwaiti person.
6. United States persons are prohibited from performance of any contract in
support of an industrial, commercial, public utility or government project in
Iraq or Kuwait.
7. United States persons are prohibited from committing or transferring
funds, or other financial or economic resources, to the Governments of Iraq or
Kuwait or to any person in Iraq or Kuwait.
Exec. Order No. 12,725, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,091 (1990); Exec. Order No. 12,724, 55 Fed.
Reg. 33,089 (1990).
43. 55 Fed. Reg. 33,091 (1990).
44. Pub. L. No. 79-264, ch. 583, 59 Stat. 619 (1945) (22 U.S.C. §§ 287-287(e)
(1988).
45. Section 5 of the Act authorizes the President to apply, pursuant to a
mandatory decision of the Security Council under article 41, economic sanctions and
severance of communications with respect to a target state. 22 U.S.C. § 287c(a)
(1988). It does not include severance of diplomatic relations, a possible sanction under
article 41, since this was viewed as an inherent constitutional power of the President
not requiring a statutory authorization.
The authority granted to the President by the U.N. Security Council pursuant to
article 41 of the U.N. Charter, is to:
investigate, regulate, or prohibit, in whole or in part, economic relations or
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication
between any foreign country or any national thereof or any person therein and
the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involv-
ing any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
22 U.S.C. §287c(a) (1988); U.N. CHARTER ART. 41.
Although these authorities are quite broad they are -similar to the authorities
granted to the President in section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act and the
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2. Assets Control Regulations
The Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC") administers the Kuwaiti Assets Control Regulations46
("KACR") and the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations 47 ("ISR"). These reg-
ulations are promulgated pursuant to the executive orders under which
all property is blocked and imports, exports, transactions and travel are
regulated. The prohibitions on imports, exports, transactions and travel
in the KACR were lifted with the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Ku-
wait 48 and the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution
686. 4 1 Imports, exports, transaction and travel with Iraq are still gener-
ally prohibited.
The KACR and the ISR block assets by prohibiting the transfer of
any property, or any interest in property, of the Governments of Ku-
wait or Iraq which is within the United States or in the possession or
under the control of a U.S. person.5 0 The prohibition on transfers of
property includes securities,5 1 goods transshipped through the United
States,5 2 and funds paid for U.S. exports of goods previously shipped to
Kuwait or Iraq.53 Unauthorized transactions are null and void and un-
enforceable . 5  In addition, financial assets which may not be trans-
ferred must be kept in a blocked, interest-bearing account.
5 5
International Emergency Economic Powers Act. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982 & Supp. V
1987).
46. 55 Fed. Reg. 49,856 (1990) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 570) [hereinafter
"KACR"].
47. 56 Fed. Reg. 2,112 (1991) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 575) [hereinafter
"ISR"].
48. 56 Fed. Reg. 10,356 (1991).
49. U.N. SCOR (2978th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (1991). Resolution 686
requests United Nations member states to "take all appropriate action to cooperate
with the government and people of Kuwait in the reconstruction of their country." Id.
50. The term "U.S. person" means any United States citizen or person within the
United States and any organization formed under the laws of the United States, in-
cluding the organization's foreign branches. KACR, supra note 46, at 49,861 (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. § 570.321); ISR, supra note 47, at 2,116 (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. § 575.321).
51. KACR, supra note 46, at 49,858 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 570.201(b));
ISR, supra note 47, at 2,114 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 570.201(b)).
52. KACR, supra note 46, at 49,861 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 570.409); ISR,
supra note 47, at 2,117 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 575.409).
53. KACR, supra note 46, at 49,861 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 570.404); ISR,
supra note 47, at 2,117 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 575.404).
54. KACR, supra ntoe 46, at 49,858 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 570.202); ISR,
supra note 47, at 2,114 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 575.202).
55. KACR, supra note 46, at 49,858 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 570.203); ISR,
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The KACR and the ISR establish several general licenses" for
certain transfers of property. Kuwaiti and Iraqi funds may be trans-
ferred to blocked accounts held in the name of their respective govern-
ments in U.S. financial institutions, including receipt of payments and
transfers among blocked accounts for purposes of investment or rein-
vestment." Transfers may also be used to satisfy obligations under a
banker's acceptance" and under certain contracts which were entered
into before August 2, 1990. Such activities may include those which
involve foreign exchange, securities, currency and interest rate transac-
tions, commodity option, swap and futures transactions.6 Transfers
may also be made to satisfy obligations to U.S. persons arising before
August 2, 1990.6' Specific licenses62 may be obtained on a case-by-case
basis for payments for goods and services exported to Kuwait prior to
August 2, 1990.3
As a result of Security Council Resolution 686, exports and im-
ports to and from Kuwait are not restricted under the KACR.6 ' Since
Kuwaiti assets remain blocked, however, the import or export transac-
tion may not involve a debit to a blocked account unless otherwise au-
supra note 47, at 2,114 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 575.203).
56. The term "general license" means any transaction or activity authorized by
the Kuwait Assets Control Regulations. KACR, supra note 46, at 49,859 (to be codi-
fied at 31 C.F.R. § 570.305); ISR, supra note 47, at 2,115 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
§ 575.305).
57. The term "U.S. financial institution" includes depositor institutions, banks,
savings banks, trust companies, securities brokers and dealers, commodity futures and
options brokers and dealers, forward contact and foreign exchange merchants, securi-
ties and commodities exchanges, clearing corporations, investment companies, em-
ployee benefit plans, and U.S. holding companies, U.S. affiliates, or U.S. subsidiaries of
any of the foregoing." KACR, supra note 46, at 49,860-61 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
§ 570.320); ISR, supra note 47, at 2,116 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 575.320).
58. KACR, supra note 46, at 49,863 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 570.503); ISR,
supra note 47, at 2,118 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 575.503).
59. KACR, supra note 46 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 570.505); ISR, supra
note 47, at 2,119 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 575.505).
60. KACR, supra note 46 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 570.504). The ISR does
not contain a similar provision.
61. KACR, supra note 46, at 49,864 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 570.506); ISR,
supra note 47, at 2,119 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 575.506).
62. The term "specific license" means any transaction or activity authorized by
the OFAC pursuant to a written application. KACR, supra note 46, at 49,860 (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. § 570.316); ISR, supra note 47, at 2,116 (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. § 575.316).
63. KACR, supra note 46 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 570.510); ISR, supra
note 47, at 2,199-10 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 575.510).
64. 56 Fed. Reg. 10,356 (1991) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 570.522).
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thorized by a general or specific license. 5 Exports of dual-use goods
and technologies to Kuwait may be completed in accordance with the
Export Administration Regulations66 in the same manner as was per-
mitted before the August 2, 1990 invasion. The prohibition on exports
and imports to and from Iraq have not been similarly relaxed."
The Departments of State and Defense will certainly re-evaluate
their policies concerning exports of defense articles, defense services
and technical data to the Middle East. The Department of State is
likely to proceed on a more conservative basis with respect to these
inherently military exports.6 8
The Administration's timely removal of the export embargo on
dual-use goods and technologies is particularly noteworthy since these
exports are integral to the rebuilding of Kuwait and are necessary for
U.S. contractor participation in the rebuilding plan. The Department of
Commerce reported, based on Kuwaiti Embassy figures, that nearly
"300 contracts worth more than $500 million [were] awarded for the
first emergency stage of the Kuwaiti rebuilding plan, with more than
70% of the contracts going to U.S. firms."6 9 Kuwait could spend as
much as $100 billion before the rebuilding plan is completed."0
IV. EMERGING PROLIFERATION CONTROLS ON MISSILE
TECHNOLOGY AND NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS
The Administration has linked Saddam Hussein's use of chemical
weapons against his own citizens, his use of SCUD missiles against ci-
vilian populations, and the specter of nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons to a realization of the dangers proliferation poses. 1 This reali-
65. Id.
66. 15 C.F.R. pts. 768-99.
67. The ISR prohibits importation and dealings in Iraqi-origin goods and services.
ISR, supra note 47, at 2,114 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 575.204). This includes
transhipment of Iraqi-origin goods through the United States. Id. at 2,117 (to be codi-
fied at 31 C.F.R. § 575.409). Exports of goods, technologies and services from the
United States to Iraq are also prohibited. Id. at 2,114-5 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. §
575.205). Reexports through third countries are similarly prohibited if "subject to U.S.
jurisdiction." Id.
68. The Department of State revoked or suspended all licenses for exports and
reexports of defense articles, technical data and defense services to Iraq and Kuwait
after the August 2, 1990 invasion. 55 Fed. Reg. 31,808 (1990).
69. Commerce Opens Clearinghouse to Help U.S. Firms Seeking Kuwaiti Con-
tracts, 55 FED. CONTRACTS REP. 311 (1991).
70. Id. at 312.
71. White House press release (March 8, 1991). Many experts believe that Iraq
will possess nuclear weapons in the near future.
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zation has focused attention of the Bush Administration on the appro-
priate measures for implementing proliferation controls which will most
effectively reduce the likelihood of prospective threats from Iraq and
other nations.72 Rejecting a legislation solution proposed by Congress,
the Administration has implemented controls through Department of
Commerce regulations.
A. Reauthorization of the Export Administration Act
The Congress proposed implementing unilateral proliferation con-
trols and sanctions against Iraq in a bill to reauthorize the Export Ad-
ministration Act ("EAA"). The "Export Amendments Bill" 73 was
pocket-vetoed by the President, and it has since been re-introduced by
the Senate.
The Export Amendments Bill essentially codified the COCOM7 1
agreement negotiated by the Administration in June, 1990, at the High
Level Meeting in Paris with respect to a license-free COCOM zone,
75
72. Although enhanced proliferation controls have been under consideration for
over a year, they have taken on a new urgency since the invasion of Kuwait. Auerbach,
U.S. Pushing Curbs on Exports of Sensitive Materials, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1990, at
Cl, col. 1. Iraq is a test-case for how the world will deal with proliferation issues in the
post-Cold War era. Perspectives on the Persian Gulf, L.A. Times, Dec. 29, 1990, at
B7, col 1.
73. The Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1990, H.R. 4653, 101st Cong., 2nd
Sess., CONG. REC. S1,984-2,004 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991) (hereinafter "Export
Amendments Bill"). The Export Amendments Bill was a compromise between very
distinct House and Senate bills. While the Senate bill was better received by the Ad-
ministration, current and former administration officials testifying before the confer-
ence committee sharply criticized the House bill. Richard Perle, a former Senior De-
partment of Defense Official under the Reagan Administration, testified that the House
bill was adopted "almost certainly with little or no thought of its implications for the
sale of sensitive technology abroad" and called the bill the "Saddam Hussein Sensitive
Technology Endowment Program." President Renews Existing Export Rules as Con-
gress Prepares Reauthorization Law, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1500, 1501 (Oct. 3,
1990).
74. COCOM is the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls and
is comprised of delegations from the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and
the United States of America. Established in 1949, COCOM coordinates uniform ex-
port controls among the participating countries for their mutual security. COCOM is
not based on formal treaty, but rather on an informal understanding among the
countries.
75. The Exports Amendments Bill provided that a validated license could not be
required for the export or reexport of goods or technology to or from a COCOM mem-
ber country or a 5(k) country (e.g., Switzerland and Finland). Export Amendments
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the core list exercise 7 and favorable treatment for emerging democra-
cies in Eastern Europe. 7 The mandatory sanctions on proliferation con-
trol violators and the Iraqi sanctions in the Export Amendments Bill
were of particular concern to the Administration.
Under the proposed legislation, the Administration was to pursue
multilateral missile technology and chemical and biological controls
with such groups as the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Aus-
tralia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the 40 nation Confer-
ence on Disarmament in Geneva. 78 The Export Amendments Bill pro-
vided for unilateral controls involving development of a list of goods
and technologies for missile technology7 9 and chemical and biological
weapons "that would directly and substantially assist a foreign govern-
ment or group in acquiring the capability to develop, produce, stock-
pile, or deliver chemical or biological weapons." 80 More importantly,
the Export Amendment Bill imposed mandatory sanctions on U.S. and
foreign persons exporting such controlled goods or technologies without
Bill, supra note 74, at S1,985 § 103. This exemption from the validated license re-
quirement was not to apply to exports of commodities controlled by special multilateral
arrangement (e.g., commodities controlled for proliferation reasons) or exports to unre-
liable end-users. Id. The exemption also was not to apply to reexports to countries other
than a COCOM member and 5(k) countries for certain sensitive commodities (e.g.,
supercomputers and surreptitious listening devices). Id. As a precondition to a
COCOM member or 5(k) country being eligible for the exemption, the proposed legis-
lation required that the country adopt measures necessary to achieve a common stan-
dard of export controls. Id.
76. At the High Level Meeting, COCOM agreed to immediately remove 30 prod-
ucts from its control list and to control even fewer products in 1991 under a "core list."
The Export Amendments Bill mandated that a validated license could not be required
for the export of the affected commodities and that the commodities could not be con-
trolled unless COCOM agrees to place the commodities back on its list, excluding com-
modities controlled for proliferation reasons. Export Amendments Bill, supra note 74,
at S 1,986 § 107. The proposed legislation also required that the Administration report
to Congress on the implementation of a core list. Id.
77. The Export Amendments Bill established three levels of treatment for the
Eastern bloc: Controlled countries, controlled countries within the favorable considera-
tion policy, and decontrolled countries. Under the proposed legislation, the Department
of State was to propose that COCOM adopt a favorable consideration policy toward
controlled countries which represent a lesser strategic threat and implement an effec-
tive export control system. Export Amendments Bill, supra note 74, at S1,986 § 106. It
also provided that the President should seek agreement from COCOM to remove a
country from the list of controlled countries if, in addition, the "country takes steps to
reduce its offensive military capabilities and phase out its participation in the Warsaw
Pact, including withdrawal of Soviet troops." Id.
78. Id. at S1,992, S1,996 (§§ 302, 402, 421).
79. Export Amendment Bill, supra note 74, at S1,992-94 (§ 302).
80. Export Amendment Bill, supra note 74, at S1,996 (§ 422).
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authorization and on foreign countries developing or using controlled
items in violation of international law.81
Although the Administration is committed to enhanced prolifera-
tion controls, it objected to the Bill's limitations on the President's dis-
cretionary power to set and change foreign policy, particularly in rela-
tion to the mandatory sanctions in the proposed legislation. National
Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft advised the Congress of the Admin-
istration's concerns that the proposed legislation could undercut the
President's discretion on "ongoing efforts to achieve necessary multilat-
eral cooperation in limiting the transfer of missile technology." 82 Scow-
croft expressed further concerns regarding provisions requiring specific
sanctions for a period of one year against countries which use chemical
and biological weapons in violation of international law, and against
foreign firms that assist these countries." Scowcroft stated that the
provisions would deprive the President of "adequate discretion" to ne-
gotiate the imposition and removal of sanctions.8 4 Secretary of State
James Baker also urged the Congress to adopt more flexible language
concerning the sanctions against violators. 85
On similar grounds, the Administration further opposed the Ex-
port Amendments Bill because it codified the sanctions against Iraq.8"
Administration officials contended that the President's discretionary
power to remove or alter sanctions would be limited.87
B. The Bush Administration's Solution to the Proliferation
Problem
On November 16, 1990, the President formally withheld his ap-
proval of the Export Amendments Bill.88 The President supported the
"principles and goals" of the proposed legislation, but found that it
contained elements that "would undermine these objectives and [the
Administration's] ability to act quickly, decisively, and multilaterally
81. Id. at S1,992-94, S1,996-99 (§§ 302, 423, 441, and 442).
82. House, Senate Conferees Reach Agreement on Legislation to Extend Export




85. Id. at 1609.
86. Export Amendment Bill, supra note 74, at S1,999-2001 (Title V).
87. Legislation, supra note 82.
88. Memorandum of Disapproval, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1839 (Nov. 16,
1990).
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at a time when [it] must be able to do so."89 He also found that
"[t]hese provisions unduly interfere with the President's constitutional
responsibilities for carrying out foreign policy." 90 The President cited
the unilateral sanctions on violators of the proliferation controls as the
"major flaw" in the Export Amendments Bill.9' He found that the
sanctions would "harm U.S. economic interests and provoke friendly
countries. 92
Rather than approve the Export Amendment Bill, the President
issued proliferation controls by executive order under the authority of
IEEPA.9' Executive Order 12,735 directs the Secretary of State to pur-
sue multilateral efforts to stop the proliferation of chemical and biologi-
cal weapons. 94 As under the Export Amendments Bill, the Executive
Order directs the Secretaries of State and Commerce to develop a list
of controlled goods and technologies. 95 The Executive Order prohibits
the export of the controlled items except when destined for a country
whose government has entered into a bilateral or multilateral agree-
ment for the control of chemical and biological weapons with the
United States.96 The Secretary of State, at his discretion, may impose
sanctions against U.S. persons, foreign persons and foreign countries
violating the Executive Order. 97
On December 13, 1990, pursuant to the Executive Order, the Ad-
ministration issued an initiative enhancing proliferation controls.98 The
initiative established an inter-agency review process-leading up
through the sub-cabinet and cabinet levels-for export applications
subject to foreign policy proliferation controls.99 The initiative also set
forth specific measures for stopping the spread of missile technology as





93. Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation, Exec. Order No. 12,735, 55




97. Id. at 48,588.
98. President Clears Export Control Initiatives, Computer Exports to Brazil, In-
dia, and China, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1914 (Dec. 19, 1990).
99. Id. at 1932.
100. Set forth below are the specific measures adopted by the President in the
Proliferation Control Initiative:
1. The United States shall adopt worldwide export controls on 50 precursors
for chemical weapons and shall urge all nations that manufacture these chem-
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The enhanced proliferation control initiative will be fully imple-
mented by amendment to the Export Administration Regulations. On
March 13, 1991, the Department of Commerce published two interim
rules and one proposed rule in accordance with the President's initia-
tive.10 1 One interim rule requires that U.S. exporters obtain a validated
license for exports of precursor chemicals that can be used in the pro-
duction of chemical weapons to all destinations, except the Australia
Group.0 2 The rule covers fifty chemicals which have been identified as
chemical weapon precursors by the Australia Group.'03 This is a sub-
stantial increase from the eleven chemicals previously requiring a vali-
dated license.104 , Moreover, the precursors controlled by the interim
rule are primarily used for non-weapon purposes.
The other interim rule requires that U.S. exporters obtain a vali-
dated license for exports of equipment and technical data related to the
icals to adopt equivalent controls.
2. Export licenses shall be required for proposed exports of potentially chemi-
cal-weapon-related industrial facilities, and related designs and technology.
3. Export licenses shall be required for any export destined for a publicly-
listed company, ministry, project, or other entity that is engaged in activities
of proliferation concern.
4. Export licenses shall be required when an exporter knows or is informed by
the U.S. Government that a proposed export may be destined for a project of
proliferation concern. (A similar regulation already applies to exports of pos-
sible nuclear-weapon concerns.)
5. Current regulations shall be supplemented by control lists of (i) dual-use
equipment and technology related to chemical weapons, biological weapons,
and missiles, and (ii) countries to which such equipment and technology shall
be controlled.
6. Civil and criminal penalties shall be imposed upon U.S. citizens who know-
ingly participate in activities that promote the spread of missile technology
and chemical weapons. (Similar penalties already apply in the areas of nu-
clear and biological weapons.)
Id. at 1933.
101. Expansion of Foreign Policy Controls on Chemical Weapons Precursor, 56
Fed. Reg. 10,756 (1991) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 776, 799) [hereinafter Pre-
cursor Rule]; Imposition of Foreign Policy Controls on Equipment and Technical
Data Related to the Production of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 56 Fed. Reg.
10,760 (1991) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 770, 776, 778, 799) [hereinafter Equip-
ment Rule]; Imposition and Expansion of Foreign Policy Controls, 56 Fed. Reg.
10,765 (1991) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 771, 776, 778) [hereinafter Proposed
Rule].
102. Precursor Rule, supra note 101, at 10,758 (to be codified at Supp. I to
799.2).
103. Id. at 10,756.
104. Prior to the Precursor-Rule, only eleven chemical precursor were controlled
under ECCN 5798F. Id.
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production of chemical and biological weapons when destined for coun-
tries in the Middle East or Southwest Asia or certain other coun-
tries. 1 5 A broad range of goods and technologies are controlled under
this rule, including pumps and valves, media for the growth of microor-
ganisms, and toxic gas monitoring systems.' 08 These goods were not
controlled prior to the interim rule.
The proposed rule will, among other things, require that U.S. ex-
ports obtain a validated license for any export when the exporter
"knows" the good or technology will be used in the design, develop-
ment, production or use of missiles or chemical or biological weapons in
connection with a restricted project. 10 7 The Department of Commerce
is considering adopting a standard under which an exporter will be
deemed to "know" of a circumstance or result. The standards under
consideration are when a U.S. person "is aware that such circumstance
exists, or that such result is substantially certain to occur," or when a
U.S. person "has a firm belief that such circumstance exists, or that
such result is substantially certain to occur. '"108 The proposed rule will
also restrict participation by U.S. persons in the construction of foreign
plants that produce chemicals.1 °
The Administration's approach to the proliferation problem is sim-
ilar to that of the Export Amendments Bill: Unilateral proliferation
controls are implemented while a high priority is placed on securing
multilateral controls. The fundamental difference, however, is that the
Administration retains discretionary power to negotiate the imposition
and removal of sanctions. Under the Administration's approach, com-
pliance with multilateral proliferation agreements can be achieved, for
example, by offering to remove sanctions in exchange for compliance.
The one-year mandatory sanctions contemplated by the congressional
approach do not lend themselves to this type of bargaining.
Industry opponents of enhanced proliferation controls are con-
cerned that the controls will not be implemented multilaterally." 0 They
argue that controls would affect exports only from U.S. -companies,
105. Equipment Rule, supra note 101, at 10,762 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §
776.20(a)(1)).
.106. Id. at 10,760.
107. Proposed Rule, supra note 101, at 10,770 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §
778.9).
108. Proposed Rule, supra note 101.
109. Id. at 10,770 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 778.9).
110. Industry Attacks U.S. Plan to Impose Unilateral Curbs on Proliferation Ex-
ports, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1697 (Nov. 7, 1990); U.S. Pushing Curbs on Exports
of Sensitive Materials, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1990, at C1 (hereinafter Exports].
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particularly companies in the chemical industry.11' Industry and Ad-
ministration officials argue that "export controls work only if they are
enforced by a multilateral agreement, such as [the COCOM agree-
ments] that set Cold War curbs on sales to the Soviet Union and its
Eastern Bloc satellites." '112
C. Emerging Multilateral Proliferation Controls
It is anticipated that at least some of the proliferation controls ad-
vocated by the Bush administration will be implemented by multilat-
eral agreement in 1991, although the multilateral controls will not be
through COCOM. The COCOM Executive Committee, which is com-
prised of officials at the deputy assistant secretary level, tentatively de-
cided at its November, 1990 meeting in Paris that it should not
broaden its mandate to include proliferation controls."13 COCOM is
comprised of Western nations with an aim toward containing the East
bloc, an objective which remains viable at least through 1991. Because
proliferation controls require the cooperation of the Soviet Union and
the People's Republic of China to be effective, it would be a conflict of
interests for COCOM to assume -the responsibility of administering
multilateral proliferation controls.
It is more likely that the Missile Technology Control Regime, the
Australia Group, and the London Nuclear Suppliers Group, controlling
missile technology, chemical and biological weapons and nuclear tech-
nology, respectively, will each expand their missions to accommodate
multilateral proliferation controls. 4 The United States is currently
seeking the agreement of all Australia Group governments to adopt
controls equivalent to the interim rules which were issued by the De-
partment of Commerce." 5 The Administration has announced that it
has "initiated vigorous efforts to obtain allied support for chemical and
biological weapon export controls in the Australia Group, missile ex-
port controls in the Missile Technology Control Regime, and nuclear
export controls through consultation with major nuclear suppliers. '""
Preliminary observations concerning the formation of a multilat-
111. As much as $250 billion dollars worth of U.S. exports could be affected.
Exports, supra note 110.
112. Id.
113. Plans Afoot to Broaden Non-Proliferation Controls, But Not Through
COCOM, 8 Inside U.S. Trade, Nov. 30, 1990, at 1.
114. Id. at 2.
115. Precursor Rule, supra note 101, at 10,756; Equipment Rule, supra note 101,
at 10,760.
116. White House press release (March 8, 1991).
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eral proliferation control regime indicate that it will be inherently dif-
ferent than COCOM. While COCOM's mission was to contain the
East bloc, the proliferation regime's mission will be to control regional
powers and state-sponsored terrorism through their ability to obtain ad-
vanced weapons and technologies of proliferation concern.11 7 Moreover,
the United States and the regime will not be able to influence all sup-
pliers of controlled goods and technologies, as they did under
COCOM."1 8 Finally, with the end of the Cold War, the regime can
now include the requisite membership of the Soviet Union and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. " 9
The prospect of one or more control organizations joining together
presents issues of coordinating the multilateral effort. The objective of
the regime will be to assimilate all nations in the forbearance or con-
trolled use of missile technology and nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons. However, as the number of participants increases, divergent
views will become more prevalent, creating difficulties in identifying
targets and defining mechanisms. 2 ' On the other hand, expansive
membership in the regime will increase the impact of sanctions. 21 Al-
though some advocate a single organization to manage and coordinate
proliferations controls, there are practical problems in negotiating con-
trols with a large number of states. Rather, a more reasoned approach
is to expand the missions of the Missile Tehnology Control Regime, the
Australia Group and the Nuclear Suppliers Group and to establish new
channels of communication between the organizations. "'
V. CONCLUSION
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has set a precedent for world-wide
cooperation in imposing economic sanctions through the United Na-
tions. The sanctions imposed against Iraq and against Kuwait for its
protection represent, for the first time, truly world-wide sanctions.
Nonetheless, the more significant and far reaching effect of the
invasion may be the emergence of multilateral proliferation controls.
Although enhanced proliferation controls on missile technology and nu-
clear, chemical and biological weapons have been under consideration
117. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, FINDING COMMON GROUND 15 (1991).
118. Id. at 130. COCOM members were the suppliers of the control goods and
technologies. Under the control regime, however, some suppliers will not be members of
the regime, but rather, the target of the regime.
119. Id. at 2.
120. Id. at 130.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 232.
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by the Bush Administration for over a year, the Iraqi crisis has created
a sense of urgency to immediately implement unilateral controls. The
invasion is likely to have a similar impact on a multilateral level. The
Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the
London Nuclear Suppliers Group are best suited to undertake the mul-
tilateral proliferation control initiative. Most certainly, the United Na-
tions' unprecedented use of multilateral sanctions and the emerging
multilateral proliferation controls will be instrumental in the alignment
of a new world order.

